Dear vLLM Team,
We are a security research group, and while we are impressed with vLLM’s innovative design, particularly the efficiency of its PageAttention mechanism and chunk-based token management, we have identified a potential security vulnerability. This issue arises from the prefix caching mechanism, which may expose the system to a timing side-channel attack.
Description
When a new prompt is processed, if the PageAttention mechanism finds a matching prefix chunk, the prefill process speeds up, which is reflected in the TTFT (Time to First Token). Our tests revealed that the timing differences caused by matching chunks are significant enough to be recognized and exploited.
For instance, if the victim has submitted a sensitive prompt or if a valuable system prompt has been cached, an attacker sharing the same backend could attempt to guess the victim's input. By measuring the TTFT based on prefix matches, the attacker could verify if their guess is correct, leading to potential leakage of private information.
Unlike token-by-token sharing mechanisms, vLLM’s chunk-based approach (PageAttention) processes tokens in larger units (chunks). In our tests, with chunk_size=2, the timing differences became noticeable enough to allow attackers to infer whether portions of their input match the victim's prompt at the chunk level.
Environment
- GPU: NVIDIA A100 (40G)
- CUDA: 11.8
- PyTorch: 2.3.1
- OS: Ubuntu 18.04
- vLLM: v0.5.1
Configuration: We launched vLLM using the default settings and adjusted chunk_size=2 to evaluate the TTFT.
Leakage
We conducted our tests using LLaMA2-70B-GPTQ on a single device. We analyzed the timing differences when prompts shared prefixes of 2 chunks, and plotted the corresponding ROC curves. Our results suggest that timing differences can be reliably used to distinguish prefix matches, demonstrating a potential side-channel vulnerability.
Results
In our experiment, we analyzed the response time differences between cache hits and misses in vLLM's PageAttention mechanism. Using ROC curve analysis to assess the distinguishability of these timing differences, we observed the following results:
- With a 1-token prefix, the ROC curve yielded an AUC value of 0.571, indicating that even with a short prefix, an attacker can reasonably distinguish between cache hits and misses based on response times.
- When the prefix length increases to 8 tokens, the AUC value rises significantly to 0.99, showing that the attacker can almost perfectly identify cache hits with a longer prefix.
Fixes
russellb Coordinator
dr75 Remediation developer
DarkLight1337 Remediation reviewer
Dear vLLM Team,
We are a security research group, and while we are impressed with vLLM’s innovative design, particularly the efficiency of its PageAttention mechanism and chunk-based token management, we have identified a potential security vulnerability. This issue arises from the prefix caching mechanism, which may expose the system to a timing side-channel attack.
Description
When a new prompt is processed, if the PageAttention mechanism finds a matching prefix chunk, the prefill process speeds up, which is reflected in the TTFT (Time to First Token). Our tests revealed that the timing differences caused by matching chunks are significant enough to be recognized and exploited.
For instance, if the victim has submitted a sensitive prompt or if a valuable system prompt has been cached, an attacker sharing the same backend could attempt to guess the victim's input. By measuring the TTFT based on prefix matches, the attacker could verify if their guess is correct, leading to potential leakage of private information.
Unlike token-by-token sharing mechanisms, vLLM’s chunk-based approach (PageAttention) processes tokens in larger units (chunks). In our tests, with chunk_size=2, the timing differences became noticeable enough to allow attackers to infer whether portions of their input match the victim's prompt at the chunk level.
Environment
Configuration: We launched vLLM using the default settings and adjusted chunk_size=2 to evaluate the TTFT.
Leakage
We conducted our tests using LLaMA2-70B-GPTQ on a single device. We analyzed the timing differences when prompts shared prefixes of 2 chunks, and plotted the corresponding ROC curves. Our results suggest that timing differences can be reliably used to distinguish prefix matches, demonstrating a potential side-channel vulnerability.
Results
In our experiment, we analyzed the response time differences between cache hits and misses in vLLM's PageAttention mechanism. Using ROC curve analysis to assess the distinguishability of these timing differences, we observed the following results:
Fixes