Impact
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing the requests using a PathPrefix
, Path
or PathRegex
matcher.
When Traefik is configured to route the requests to a backend using a matcher based on the path, if the URL contains a URL encoded string in its path, it’s possible to target a backend, exposed using another router, by-passing the middlewares chain.
Example
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRoute
metadata:
name: my-service
spec:
routes:
- match: PathPrefix(‘/service’)
kind: Rule
services:
- name: service-a
port: 8080
middlewares:
- name: my-middleware-a
- match: PathPrefix(‘/service/sub-path’)
kind: Rule
services:
- name: service-a
port: 8080
In such a case, the request http://mydomain.example.com/service/sub-path/%2e%2e/other-path
will reach the backend my-service-a
without operating the middleware my-middleware-a
unless the computed path is http://mydomain.example.com/service/other-path
and should be computes by the first router (operating my-middleware-a
).
Patches
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description
### Summary
Path traversal with "/../" using URL encodings ("/%2e%2e") allows for circumventing routing rules.
Details
When having defined a route, you can path traverse using the URL encoded variant of /../ and reach endpoints that are not made publicly available. This issue has been found and fixed earlier with regular /../ and has been fixed in this CVE. This URL encoding trick works around that
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32431
Simply implementing a check on the URL encoding won't be sufficient as path traversal can take numerous formats. See examples here:
https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-web/file-inclusion/index.html
PoC
Setup a service with two endpoints: "/public" and "/private", which returns a 200 OK for both
Setup a Traefik proxy with a single route which points to the service using path /public
Regular requests to traefik /public will return 200 OK and to /private should return 404 (response by Traefik)
When making a request to /public/%2e%2e/private you should receive a 200 OK.
Impact
Impacts all traefik implementations with path prefix routes that expose only part of the downstream api
Suggestion
Provide configuration property which disables all path traversals. Steps:
- Decode URL
- Evaluate and construct relative path (do traversal before route evaluation)
- Compare relative/evaluated path to configured routes (PathPrefix/pathRegexp)
### References
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/
GHSA-vrch-868g-9jx5
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/08d5dfee0164aa54dd44a467870042e18e8d3f00
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.25
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.4.1
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/
CVE-2025-47952
Impact
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing the requests using a
PathPrefix
,Path
orPathRegex
matcher.When Traefik is configured to route the requests to a backend using a matcher based on the path, if the URL contains a URL encoded string in its path, it’s possible to target a backend, exposed using another router, by-passing the middlewares chain.
Example
In such a case, the request
http://mydomain.example.com/service/sub-path/%2e%2e/other-path
will reach the backendmy-service-a
without operating the middlewaremy-middleware-a
unless the computed path ishttp://mydomain.example.com/service/other-path
and should be computes by the first router (operatingmy-middleware-a
).Patches
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description
### SummaryPath traversal with "/../" using URL encodings ("/%2e%2e") allows for circumventing routing rules.
Details
When having defined a route, you can path traverse using the URL encoded variant of /../ and reach endpoints that are not made publicly available. This issue has been found and fixed earlier with regular /../ and has been fixed in this CVE. This URL encoding trick works around that
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32431
Simply implementing a check on the URL encoding won't be sufficient as path traversal can take numerous formats. See examples here:
https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-web/file-inclusion/index.html
PoC
Setup a service with two endpoints: "/public" and "/private", which returns a 200 OK for both
Setup a Traefik proxy with a single route which points to the service using path /public
Regular requests to traefik /public will return 200 OK and to /private should return 404 (response by Traefik)
When making a request to /public/%2e%2e/private you should receive a 200 OK.
Impact
Impacts all traefik implementations with path prefix routes that expose only part of the downstream api
Suggestion
Provide configuration property which disables all path traversals. Steps: